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using such weapons. Each chapter is a
self-contained unit that ends with a sep-
arate bibliography and a list of applicable
treaties. This approach is particularly
valuable for a reader who wants to re-
view quickly only one of the subjects
covered.
The author does a good job presenting
both sides of the issues surrounding
these weapons. He clearly views these
issues from a legal, arms-control per-
spective, as opposed to that of someone
who might have actually to employ the
weapons in combat. This is hardly sur-
prising, given the author’s background.
Koplow is a professor of law at George-
town University Law Center and direc-
tor of the Center for Applied Legal
Studies. He has the added credentials of
service in both the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency and the Depart-
ment of Defense.
A quick look at chapter 6, on smart
antipersonnel mines, illustrates the
book’s strengths (which are major) and
its weaknesses (which are minor). The
scenario is hypothetical and involves a
country called “Kafiristan.” In my view,
such cases are less powerful than his
historical ones, such as the use of
precision-guided bombs against heavily
defended bridges in North Vietnam.
This chapter provides a useful primer
on land-mine warfare, including im-
portant definitions explaining self-
destructing, self-neutralizing, and
self-deactivating mines. It also discusses
the two current, but competing, treaties
on the subject: the 1980 United Nations
Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons, which was signed by the
United States, and the more restrictive
1997 Ottawa Treaty, which the United
States did not sign.
Whether one agrees or not with
Koplow’s conclusions, Death by Moder-
ation is a valuable addition to the litera-
ture because it forces the reader to
think about a number of important is-




Thies, Wallace J. Why NATO Endures. New York:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009. 321pp. $90
The study of alliances is central to our
understanding of international rela-
tions. Wallace Thies, a reputable NATO
scholar, argues that the “iron law of co-
alitions”—that alliances are formed to
resist enemies and do not outlast
them—must be rethought because of
NATO’s record-breaking performance
over the past six decades. The title, Why
NATO Endures, therefore understates
the sweeping conclusion of this concise
and readable essay.
Thies’s rhetorical technique is to docu-
ment how contemporaneous observers
have characterized six tumultuous inci-
dents in NATO’s existence as life-
threatening crises, then to evaluate with
the clarity of hindsight the alliance’s
self-healing tendencies. In each case,
NATO emerges as a stronger alliance
with improved vitality.
The analysis draws from both historical
sources and political-science research to
contrast traditional alliances with
NATO. Thies’s principal points are
both simple and profound. The Euro-
pean alliances of past centuries were cut
from different cloth than was the North
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Atlantic alliance. Early alliances seemed
designed to be transitory. There was no
need for cooperation, integration, prep-
aration, or even friendship among
Bismarckian-era allies in a multipolar
world. Offensive wars were fought for
territory and treasure. However, this
situation was turned on its head when
two superpowers developed alliance
systems in an ideological struggle where
contesting armies had thermonuclear
weapons and needed to be ready to
fight for national survival on a mo-
ment’s notice. Further, NATO’s mem-
bers were liberal democracies empow-
ered to take positions independent of
the United States on any number of is-
sues and were willing to air these differ-
ences in public.
The author’s well-informed encapsula-
tion of the six “fatal” crises that NATO
has weathered over the years provides
scholars and interested general readers
insight, perspective, and juicy anec-
dotes. The author’s technique of laying
out the problem in each case and fol-
lowing with “what actually happened”
makes for a series of intriguing and illu-
minating vignettes in diplomatic his-
tory. Watching them unfold in real
time, without the benefit of opened ar-
chives and clear hindsight, was not
nearly as satisfying or rewarding.
A second cavil with the book’s title
(and the more important one) is that it
is conclusive only in the past tense. The
book is certainly a persuasive explana-
tion as to why NATO endured. It offers
a plausible countertheory for the cre-
ation of successful and enduring alli-
ances. However, only one of the crises
addresses the post–Cold War world in
which we find ourselves today. Indeed,
many of the circumstances that
attended NATO’s creation and suste-
nance have either vanished or are erod-
ing. Its bête noire (Russia) has ceased to
be NATO’s enemy for two decades, and
the anxieties created by imminent de-
struction have been replaced by lesser
threats, such as transnational terrorism
and crime. It remains to be seen if the
“self-healing tendencies” of democra-
cies are sufficient to enable NATO to
endure in an entirely different kind of
world. The reader will benefit from




Wheeler, Winslow T., and Lawrence J. Korb. Mil-
itary Reform: An Uneven History and an Uncertain
Future. Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press,
2009. 256pp. $24.95
In Military Reform, two national secu-
rity experts reflect on initiatives in-
tended to reform defense planning
across the entire enterprise. For decades
Winslow Wheeler and Lawrence Korb
have observed, studied, and partici-
pated in defense reform, gaining a
weathered perspective on the ideas,
events, and actions taken by national
security organizations within govern-
ment. This work describes the condi-
tions necessary or common in the
national security environment in cases
where individuals or institutions have
exhibited interest in reform.
Wheeler and Korb review the issues that
underpinned defense reform initiatives
over several decades. They describe the
actions of key individuals who champi-
oned reform ideas and the issues and
stakes of those who opposed or resisted.
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